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Observers of Russia's stumbling transition to democracy might be forgiven for regarding 
successive promises of a 'new Russian federalism' with healthy scepticism. The centralizing 
legacies of so-called Soviet federalism still cast a shadow over the rubble of the former Soviet 
multinational state. Yeltsin's tightening grip on regional leaders following his violent but 
victorious battle with parliament in October 1993 suggested plans for more centralized rule. 
The new Constitution, the hard-fought prize of that battle, established tremendous powers 
for the federal executive and left the division of powers between centre and periphery 
purposefully ambiguous. The 'Parade of Sovereignties' that opened a new decade and closed 
the old Soviet era was overstopped in its tracks by its initiator, Boris Yeltsin. 
Russia's first president did not create his powerful, 'unified' federal state. By the mid-
199os, federal and regional authorities alike bemoaned the failure to create a cohesive state 
system that could address mounting economic and social problems, although each side 
proposed very different solutions. Soon after the referendum that narrowly ratified his 
Constitution, Yeltsin launched a new parade. Signing treaties (dogovory) and agreements 
(soglasheniya) with the executive heads of ethnic republics (and soon thereafter with oblasts 
and krais), Yeltsin eroded the legal equality his Constitution proclaimed for different levels 
of centre-periphery relations. Savvy regional negotiators won budget privileges, powers of 
appointment, exemption from various federal requirements, and a tacit understanding that 
federal officials-at least for the time being-would look away from glaring violations of the 
federal Constitution and basic democratic principles. 
With the sudden rise of Vladimir Putin, Russian federalism made another volte-face. The 
ambiguous enforceability of Yeltsin's treaties-never ratified by legislatures-was made 
clear by Putin's disregard for executive promises that no longer suited his interests. One of 
Putin's first presidential decrees, signed days after his inauguration, divided Russia into 
seven federal districts, each encompassing several republics, oblasts, and okrugs, and each 
headed by a presidential enforcer tasked to maintain the supremacy of federal law. Lists were 
rumoured to circulate in the Kremlin of regional leaders to be brought to heel. Putin 
described his project as the 'dictatorship of law.' 
What forces have influenced such sea-changes in Russian federal politics? How might 
political scientists approach the dynamic of centre-periphery relations in a post-Soviet, and 
now a post-Yeltsin, Russia?1 Examination of the conceptual and political struggles to define 
Chapter specially commissioned for this volume. 
1 Chechnya (Ichkeriya) is not analysed here. The two wars fought thus far (conservatively estimated to have 
killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians) have largely removed the republic from federal politics. On 8 
June 2000 Vladimir Putin issued an ukaz establishing direct presidential rule. Ukaz No 1071, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 
June 2000, p. 3. 
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Russian federalism provides insights into the path of Russian federal development and 
Russia's difficult democratic transition. 
The spectrum of federal choices 
In a country as large and multinational as Russia, it is unsurprising that renewed debates 
about federalism coincided with systemic political reform in the late i98os. Federal 
arrangements offer small polities the freedom of self-government combined with the eco-
nomic and security advantages of a larger state. Federalism also appeals to large states 
struggling with various forms of internal disharmony, but which value accommodating 
their diversity within a more unitary framework. As A. V. Dicey expressed this 'very peculiar 
state of sentiment', the citizens of a federation 'must desire union, and must not desire 
unity'.2 Ethnic or religious minorities may consider federalism the best available means of 
cultural self-preservation, less risky than secession. There is seldom a single motivation; 
many factors co-determine the prospects for federal governance. 
Federalism is best viewed as a spectrum of possible ways to divide jurisdiction over the 
same population between different levels of government. One of the best definitions of 
federalism captures its dynamic: '[The federal principle is] the method of dividing powers 
so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and 
independent.'3 But federalism is more than the sum of its definitional parts; indeed, that is 
the very real goal a federal system is designed to achieve. Ivo Duchacek noted the import-
ance of a 'federal political culture', a form of citizen loyalty to the federal polity that extends 
above and beyond regional allegiances. Acceptance of the inevitability of multiple, overlap-
ping political identities and the importance of ensuring their complementarity is crucial in a 
federal system. 
All federal systems rest upon a written, formal document, usually called a constitution, 
that is the supreme law of the land, overriding all other legislation or executive acts. As Dicey 
observed, federalism does away with the principle of the supreme sovereignty of parliament, 
which is subordinated in a federal system to a written constitution. This is one important 
distinction between federalism and the mere devolution of power, under which a parliament 
granting greater authority to lower levels of government retains the legal right (though not 
always the political ability) to revoke those powers later. An important difference between 
federal and confederal systems lies in this sovereign power accorded constitutional law. In 
confederations, established by treaty, the constituent units retain a far greater portion of 
their sovereignty and give up far fewer areas of jurisdiction to the union government. At its 
most extreme, a confederal programme may assert that the union government's proper role 
is only as agent of the component states. Thus, states might selectively reject federal laws or 
agency when they conflict with local laws and interests. This historically unstable 'doctrine 
of nullification' interprets a constitution not as a founding legal document against which a 
2 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of tl1e Law of the Constitution, loth edn. (London: Macmillan, 
1967), 141. 
3 K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 10. Compare William H. 
Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation Significnnce (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), IL For an excellent and 
detailed comparative analysis of federal systems, see Alfred Stepan, 'Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspec-
tive', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16/2. (2000). 
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constitutional court may adjudicate disputes impartially, but as a political compact always 
open to political renegotiation.4 
In many ways, the doctrine of nullification, notions of federal political culture, and the 
emphasis on a written constitution are different facets of a common theme: the problem of 
establishing an agreed framework of federal objectives. These three issues and the con-
ceptual problems they raise are omnipresent in the development of the new Russian federal-
ism. A consensus on the inherent value of the federal project is crucial for its success. In 
Russia, conceptual consensus has been conspicuous by its absence. This fundamental prob-
lem for the long-term stability of the Russian Federation can be traced back to debates about 
sovereignty and federalism reopened in the mid-198os, underscored by the 'Parade of Sover-
eignties', and which continue today. 
Conflict over the 'old' Russian federalism 
The legacy of Soviet 'federalism' has exerted considerable influence on newer thinking. 
Lenin's and Stalin's early policies gave institutional privileges to ethnic elites in order to win 
allegiance to the Soviet state. The regime created what one scholar called the 'institutional-
ised monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity'. 5 The map of Russia was redrawn 
to create new nations with their own administrative regions-these political boundaries 
have remained virtually unchanged. Early Soviet constitutions combined the language of 
federalism with the reality of democratic centralism. Contrary to the federal principle that 
certain spheres of authority remain the exclusive jurisdiction of each level of government, 
early Soviet constitutions created the legal fiction of 'dual subordination': each executive 
body was accountable both to its electorate and to the executive body higher in the hierarchy 
of democratic centralism. As one constitutional scholar observed: '[W]hile centralism might 
conceivably be reconciled with democracy it was entirely incompatible with local auton-
omy .... By coupling "horizontal" with "vertical" subordination it [dual subordination] 
seemed to grant local authorities a measure of control over local affairs; by the same token, 
however, it ensured that no part of such control was truly autonomous'.6 Notions of 'hori-
zontal' and 'vertical' federal relations have lingered in the post-Soviet federal vocabulary. 
The contradictory rhetoric of Soviet federalism obstructed Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, 
in part through institutional structures that Zbigniew Brzezinski noted created 'institutional 
vessels' for nationalist sentiment.7 Federal reform was relatively low on Gorbachev's agenda 
until too late in his tenure as general secretary and Soviet president. Notes of Politburo 
discussions show that Gorbachev often listed alternatives to federation but seldom suggested 
any detailed plan of federal reform. 8 Few of his Politburo colleagues gained even that level of 
enlightenment. 
Outside the Politburo, suverenitet, federalizm, and pravovoe gosudarstvo (law-governed 
4 Keith E. Whittington, 'The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification 
Debate as an Illustration of!nformal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change', Publius, 26/2 (1996). 
5 Philip G. Roeder, 'Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization', World Politics, 43/2 (1991), 205. 
6 Aryeh L. Unger, Co11stitutio11al Develop111e11t in the USSR: A G11ide to the Soviet Co11stitutio11s (New York: Pica 
Press, 1981), 19. 
7 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Post-Communist Nationalism', Foreign Affairs, 68/5 (1989/90), 6. 
8 A. B. Veber, V. T. Loginov, G. S. Ostroumov and A. S. Chernyaev, eds., Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit' (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo 'Aprel'-85', 1995), 95. 
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state) were much more popular terms. National movements discovered that such language 
resonated well with their demands for greater economic and cultural autonomy. The eth-
nographer Yi.1lia11 Bromlci, the geographer Vladimir Sokolov, and others incautiously pro-
posed territoda l rcdivisions of between th ree and iicty separate rcpublics.9 Not everyone 
supported federal so lutions. Vladimir Zhir.inovsky: ' How can the nationalilies cris is be 
solved under these conditions? nly through fear. We need fear and a strnng patriotic 
governmenli political life in the com1tTy must be frozen, all political parties forb idden, mid 
all representative org<ms of power di banded, except for the president and his authori.sed 
local representatives (governors [gubernatoryl, vkeregents [11amest11iki]-whatever). Ali the 
republics must be abol ished."0 
The conflation of federal with confederal approaches corresponded to conflicting object-
ives held by regional and Moscow-centred polit ical elites. FederaJ authorities invariably 
advocated 'unified' or 'vertical' approaches to federalism, viewing the system as a simple 
hjerarchy or pyramid. Regional leaders naturally embraced those elements of federal theory 
thal emphasized local contro l, exclusive ju1·isdictions, and protection from an intruding 
ceolral authority. They advocated a very weak centre, while federal politicians rallied around 
the slogan 'a strong centre and strong republics'.11 
Conflicting conceptions of the new Russian federalism 
EXPECTATION: THE PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES 
Debates on federalism took p.lace in a highly charged political e1wi.ronmen t, in newly elected 
regional Supreme oviets and the First Russian ongress of People's Deputies, where de lega-
lions of regional elites actively participated in debates over the Declaration of Sovereignty 
that was issued by the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, soon to be the 
Russian Federation) on 12 June t990. This Declaration (esf eciaJJy Article Nine, wbich 'con-
fi rmed the need to broaden substan tially' the rights of federal sub-units), combined with 
Yeltsin's politicaJ junket Lhrough key regions tha t stllilmer, was an obvious invitation for 
regions to assert their own autonomy. Yeltsin's populist exhortation in Ta tarstan to ' take as 
much independence as you can hold on to,' 12 one of the most qL1oted and inflammatory 
statements of his career, deliberately focused on the element of federalism that most 
appea led to regional elites-autonomy from centralized rule. Ye! Lsin deliberately sought to 
weaken Gorbachev's power and increase his own support by galvanizing opposition to the 
federal centre. 
His p.lan worked, and the 'Parade of Sovereignties' played a key role in undermining late 
attempts to reform Soviet 'federal ism.' 'lwenty-fo ur of the forty declarations of overeignty 
were made by consti tuent units of the RSfoSR. Unlike union republics (Ukraine, Belarus, 
~ ' lcphan Kux, 'Soviet Fedenilism,' Problems of Com111w1ism (Mar.-Apr. 1990), 9. Nicholas J. Lynn and Alexei V. 
Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia: Debntes on the ld~a of f'edcralism in Russia', Publius, 27/2 (1997}, 193. Gavriil 
Popov, What is to be Done? {London; Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 1992), 26- 8, 48-9. 
10 
'Interetlmic Contradictions in Russin: The Strategy of Panics :ind Social Movenic11 ts (A l(ound lnble)', Russian 
Politics and Law, 32/5 (1994), u-12. This round table was held in Moscow on 9 June 1992. 
11 Draft 'General Principles' for self-government published by a Supreme Soviet working group, Pravda, 14 Mar. 
1989, p. 2. 
12 Yelena Chernobrovkina, Vechernaya kazan', 10 Aug. 1990, p. 1. 
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Moldova, and the Baltic, Caucasian, and Central Asian states), autonomous republics 
(ASSRs in Soviet parlance) within the RSFSR desired not independence as sovereign states 
but respect for sovereignty within a renewed federation. Their declarations, remarkably 
similar to one another, emphasized the supremacy of local over federal laws, and many went 
on to declare separate republican citizenship, language rights, and exclusive ownership and 
authority over economic resources on its territory. These documents contained the regional 
conception of what the new Russian Federation should look like: a polity that took its orders 
from its constituent members. Autonomy was to be privileged above all else. Yeltsin's gambit 
did little but foment antagonism towards any central authority. Rather than encourage 
compromise in the renegotiation of autonomy, Yeltsin encouraged a mindset which at the 
time strengthened him against Union authorities (particularly Gorbachev) but left him 
vulnerable to his own short-sighted exhortations when he became the embodiment of the 
new 'Centre.' 
NEGOTIATION: THE FEDERATION TREATY AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
Unilateral declarations of sovereignty were of minor legal-constitutional significance within 
the pre-existing Soviet system, but of enormous political significance. All ASSR declarations 
shared at least one more clause in common: these declarations were the basis for negotiating 
the Union Treaty for a renewed USSR and the Federation Treaty within the RSFSR. From the 
regional perspective, particularly that of republics, the Federation Treaty was the next logical 
step-a means to achieve the objectives expounded in these declarations. Such objectives 
were not shared by federal elites, who acquiesced to republican assertions of sovereignty, 
self-determination and even rights to secession as tolerable 'transitional devices' to maintain 
territorial integrity as the system developed.13 True to regional self-conceptions of sovereignty, 
the first founding document to be negotiated was a treaty, not a constitution. 
Central and regional elite conceptions of their common federal project starkly diverged. 
One negotiator from Bashkortostan complained, 'Acquaintance with the draft Federation 
treaty creates the impression that the authors strove to create a centralised, unitary state 
under the pretext of the Russian Federation.' The role of the sovereign republics was 'not 
more than the former guberniya of tsarist Russia. '14 The Federation Treaty that emerged was 
a patchwork of three separate treaties (one for each level of the envisaged tripartite federal 
hierarchy of republics, oblasts, and autonomous okrugs) and two protocols. 15 The signatory 
republics saw the document as the keystone of a new federal order, a point they collectively 
underscored by insisting on repeated references to it in the draft federal constitution. The 
Federation Treaty officially acknowledged republican sovereignty, the right to self-
determination and expressly prohibited federal intrusion into regional affairs, a long list of 
jurisdictions and authorities. In addition, one protocol promised half of the seats in one of 
the chambers of the proposed federal parliament to representatives of the ethnically defined 
regions (republics and autonomous okrugs).16 
13 Lynn and Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia' 191-2. Robert Sharlet, 'The Prospects for Federalism in Russian 
Constitutional Politics', Publius, 24 (1994), 119. 
'
4 Zufar Yenikeev, 'Proekt dogovora nas ne ustraivaet', Leninets, M2 138 (7644), 24 Nov. 1990, 2. 
'5 R. G. Abdulatipov and L. F. Boltenkova, eds., Federativniy dogovor: Dokumenty. Kommentarii (Moscow: Izda-
tel'stvo 'Respublika', 1992) . 
16 
'Protokol k Federativnomu dogovoru', rep. in B. A. Strashun, Federal' noe konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii: 
Osnov11ye istochniki po sostoy"niyu 11n 15 sentyabrya i996 goda (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo NORMA, i996), 198-9. 
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In addition to the protocols, a special appendix (prilozhenie) was signed exclusively for 
one republic: Bashkortostan. At the eleventh hour, Bashkortostan threatened to walk out on 
the negotiations, an act that would have collapsed the process given the refusal of two key 
republics (T.1tarstan and Chechnya) to sign the Treaty. The appendix granted special excep-
tions and privileges exclusively to Bashkortostan: its legislative and judicial systems were 
declared to be independent, assertions of independent statehood and the righl to certain 
foreign relations acknowledged, and certain statements about L'epublican control of prop-
erty were added.'7 While it could be said that these special dispensations were nominal and 
often merely a few shades different from powers provided by the Federation Treaty, the 
Appendix established a powerful precedent from the outset of the 'renewed' Russian Feder-
ation: the ink was not yet dry on the Treaty before parochial bilateral exceptions to it were 
being made.18 
The October 1993 shelling of the White House and arrest of Yeltsin's parliamentary 
opponents left the Federation Treaty subordinated to Yeltsin's draft Constitution.19 While 
Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution were nearly exact duplications of Articles I and II of 
the Treaty (establishing exclusive federal and joint jurisdictions), Treaty Article III on 
exclusive republican powers was omitted from the Constitution. The presumption that 
republics possessed all powers not explicitly handed over to Lhe Pederation in the Treaty-a 
111-ore confederal conception-was reversed by Article 73, which granted constituent units 
only those remaining powers not claimed by federal au thorities. Republican sovereignty and 
separate citizenship were no longer acknowledged. 
NULLIFICATION: THE PARADE OF TREATIES 
The Parade of Sovereignties developed a vocabulary and a mindset of provincial autonomy 
well before attempts were made to develop sound federation-wide organizing principles. 
Federation Treaty negotiations quickly fell hostage to tbat mind el as republi cs realized that 
they could ignore the federal centre (Chech.nya and Tatarstan) or mal<e last-minute ulti-
matums (Bashkortostan and Sakha-Yi1kutia} with a fair degree of impunity. Republican 
elites spoke in terms of 'treaty-constitutional' federal relations, implying their prerogatives 
as sovereign subjects of international law. Federal actors insisted on 'constitution-treaty' -
based federalism, by which they meant the strong central power that had always dominated 
centre-periphery relations in Russia. A vocabulary of federalism built on an interest in 
multilateral, transparent, and equal relations was not of particular interest to either side. 
Bilateralism, exceptionalism, and hierarchy were the emerging norms of Russian federal 
politics. 
A new phrase increasingly dominated regional conceptions of federalism-snizu vverkh, 
'from the bottom up.' At its core was the notion that a federation really was not more than 
the sum of its parts, each of which had an indissoluble sovereignty of its own. This principle 
17 M. A. Aiupov et al., eds., Stanovlenie dogovornykh otnoshenii Respubliki Bashkortostan i Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
(Ufa: Izdatel'sko-poligraficheskiy kompleks pri Sekretariate Gosudarstevennogo Sobraniya Respubliki Bashkorto-
stan, 1997). 
18 Bashkortostan was not the only republic to receive a special, long-term agreenienl in exchange for its signa-
ture. Between initialling the treaty on 14 March, and signing on 31 March 1992, the clia111ond-rich republic of Sakha-
Yakutia sign ~d a lucrative diamond outpul agrecmenL with federal ;mlhor:ities. 
'
9 Section Two, Article i, §4. Ko111lit111siya Ro$siyskoy Fec/.:rnlsii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Os'-89', 1998). 
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found expression at the highest levels of regional politics. 20 In Tatarstan, the phrase even 
influenced republican law, passed weeks after the acceptance of a fiercely independent 
republican Constitution, which appealed to the then Russian Federal Supreme Soviet to 
construct 'treaty-constitutional relations' with the republic. 21 
Republican constitutions based their legitimacy on many of the same principles found in 
declarations of sovereignty, foremost of which was the principle that republican laws (by 
virtue of state sovereignty) retained supremacy over federal legislation. A hierarchy implicit 
in the treaty-constitutional approach raised republics above the federal government in all 
matters save those explicitly transferred by the republics. This approach sounded less in 
federal solutions and more in confederal ones. The federal approach was the reverse, sum-
marized in 1994 by Yeltsin's then chief-of-staff Sergei Filatov: 'The most general trends are 
the aspiration of the republic elites to represent the powers of the Russian Federation as the 
sum of powers delegated by the components (this is notably characteristic of the constitu-
tions of Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Sakha, Tatarstan, and Tuva). However, the powers of the 
Russian Federation ensue from its own sovereignty as a single, integral federative state, and 
they do not depend on the components.' 22 
Yeltsin responded to regional assertions of sovereignty by beginning a new parade, the 
Parade of Treaties. 'I have not renounced my formula,' he declared in the spring of 1994, 
'Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.'23 Tatarstan was the first republic to receive a 
bilateral treaty, signed in February 1994 (although negotiations had taken several years). 
Bilateral treaties were really several documents: a treaty (dogovor), establishing general prin-
ciples, and a complement of agreements (sovershenie) that provided short-term (five-year) 
concrete arrangements for budgetary, tax, personnel, and other relationships. Between 1994 
and i998, forty-six of the eighty-nine subjects of the Federation signed bilateral treaties with 
the federal executive. 
The Parade of Treaties raised a number of serious questions for the future of Russian 
federalism. First, the practice of overriding, supplementing, or amending centre-periphery 
relations established in the federal Constitution highlighted the controversy and confusion 
of 'treaty-constitutional' versus 'constitutional-treaty' approaches to federalism. How 
important was the Constitution compared to a bilateral treaty? Second, it was unclear where 
bilateral treaties should be placed in the hierarchy of laws established by the Constitution. 
Bilateral treaties were never ratified by either federal or regional legislatures; they were 
wholly executive-driven relationships, exclusively involving presidents, governors, and 
prime ministers. This question of legality was further aggravated by the suspicion shared by 
many regional leaders that, in addition to published treaties, secret agreements were also 
negotiated. Third, apart from the content of bilateral treaties, the process of negotiation 
entailed a certain brinkmanship: the best treaties were negotiated by regions with the power 
20 Rashit Vagizov, a committee chairman in the Tatarstan Parliament, insisted that the voluntary delegation of 
political power 'from the bottom up' was a core principle of federalism. Author's interview, 10 June 1997, Tatarstan 
State Soviet, Kazan. 
21 Tatar Law 'On the order introducing into action the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan', in Rafael' 
Khakimov, ed., Belaya kniga Tatarstuna: put' k suverenitetu, 1990-1995 (Kazan: Tsentr gumanitarnykh proektov i 
issledovanii, i996), 23-4. 
22 
'Filatov on Center-Region Constitutional Issues', FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia, 2 Sept. 1994, p. i9. 
2J Elena Tregubova, 'Boris Yel'tsin v Tatarii', Segodnya, 31 May 1994, p. 1. 
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and nerve to withhold tax payments, boycott federal elections or otherwise exempt them-
selves from the federal polity. 
The proliferation of treaties was accompanied by the adoption by republics and regions of 
their own coJ1stilutions and charters. The so-called 'War of Laws,' coincident with the 
parade of treaties, produced thousands oflaws and constihrtionaJ clauses that contradicted 
the federal constitution and federal Jaw. The Ru sian Federa.Lion Ministry of Justice 
a.trnow1ced in late i996 tha t nineteen out of twenty .. one republican constitutions violated 
the federal Constitution.24 Article Seven of the onstitution of the Republic of lngushetia 
announced that a federal law was 'lawful' only to the extent that i t did not violate the 
'sovereign rights' of the republic. A1·ticlc 41 of the onstitution of Sakha-Yakutia required 
federal legislatio n to pass, vote iu the l wer chamber of the republican parliament before its 
juri diction wouJcl be accepted in the republ ic. Other republics, for example Adygeya and 
Dagestan, reserved the right to suspend federal legislation, subject to var ying degrees of 
arbitration.25 Despite the strong language of the federal Constitution and the small but 
growing number of h igh court cases denouncing regional non-compliance and malfeasance, 
republlcs c ntinued to seek alternatives to lhe federal framework, often openly defying it. 26 
These are extraordinary claims for component states in a federal system, for they call into 
question the very unified legal pace that is both a hallmark and a fundamental advantage of 
federation. The pedls of nullification and the potential for the destruction of a federal civic 
identity are very real. 
Putin's way: towards a 'dictatorship of law'? 
Yeltsin made weak attempts t restructure increasingly difficult relations. On 30 July 1999 a 
new federal law came into force to regu late the bilaternl trea ly process.27 The law re-
emphasized the supremacy of federal laws and Constitution in the legal hierarchy, categoric-
ally stated the prin cip le of glasnost in treaty promulgation, and gave regions lhree years to 
briiJg existing treatie into conformity with federal law. However, the law stopped short of 
establishing the ratification of Lr~ties by federal and regional legislatures, requiring only 
examination ( rassmotreniya) by the legislature prior to adoption. Given that no treaty had 
been sigoed since June t998, the law seemed conspicuously late. 
The inauguration of Vladimir Putin led to substru1tial change for Russi..111 federaLisnL Less 
than a week after taking his oath of office, Puli.n issued a presidential. decree ( nkaz) on 'The 
Status of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President in a Federal District'."8 The 
24 Irina Nagornykh, 'Rcgiony stnviat na konfrontat iyu', Scgodnya, 22 Nov. i996, p. 2. 
25 Konstitur5ii Rcspublik v sostave Rossiysk'ay Fedem1sii, Vypusk 1 (Moscow: Izdanie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy, 
lzvcsriia, 1995). 
~ See e.g. 'Postanovlc1\.ie J<onstitutsionnogo Suda Rossi i,skoy Pccleratsii po delu o µrnvcrke konstitu lsionr1o~ti 
, lucey 80, 92, 93 i 911 Konstitutsii Resp11l liki Ko mi i stat'i JI Znko1m .Resp11bliki Kami ot 31 okt iubryn 1994 i;od;1 "Ob 
ort1anakh ispolnitcl'noy vlasti v RC$publike Ko mi" ·, 11.,miisknya g11zctr1, 31 Jan. 1998, p. •J; Alexander _flla11kenngel, 
' l.ocn l Sclf-Governmcnt vs. State Administrntioi1: 'l11c U<lJ'nurti in Decision', Eni r li1ll'Ofiunt1 Comt itr11.in1111/ Rcvit!w, 61 
I (1!)1)7), )l. 
T/ ZakQn 'O prin ts ipakh i poriadke raigrnnicheniya prcd111etov vedc11 iya i polnomochii me7.hdu org1111ami 
gosmlul'stvennoy vlasti llossiyskoy ~'edcr~tsi.i i organm11i gosudarstvennoy vlasti sub"tktov Ro~siyskoy Fedcratsii', 
Solmuiia zak1111odatd's11m Rossiy>kuy Fetlera t:sii, 26 (18 June 1999), item 3176, pp. 5685-92. 
28 Rossiyskaya gazeta, i6 May 2000, p. 5. 
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decree divided Russia into seven federal districts to which Putin appointed plenipotentiary 
representatives L oorclinate the activity offederal orga ns, ensure Lhe observance offcdcral 
laws and the confo rmity of regional laws to the federa l Constitution, and to suggest Lo the 
presid nl the suspension or nQn-couformin~ legisl:ll ion and executive normative a ts. M re 
11knzy so n fo llowed, declaring laws or executjve orders of some reg.ions in violation of 
federal law and therefore null and void.29 Boris Nemrsov, a form er govern or and leader of 
the Union of Right Forces, recognized the key to Lhc decrees would lie in th caJjbre and 
standing of the people appointed to head the new districts. If they were just 'run-of-the-mill 
bureaucrats', then the whole new system would be 'nothing other than decorative'.30 Putin's 
choices indicated his resolve: five of the seven representatives were generals (including 
Viktor Cherkesov, former deputy director of the FSB, and Petr Latyshev, former deputy 
minister of the MVD).3' 
Putin followed his ukaz with a salvo of proposals to reform the Federation Council and 
give him the power to dismiss recalcitrant executives, legislatures, and local government 
officials throughout the Federation.32 Eugene Huskey, earlier in this volume (Chapter 6), 
analyses these bills, all three of which were signed in to law after difficult passage through the 
Federal Assembly.33 Putin's apparent victory, however, presents serious concerns of executive 
overreach, tipping an already fragile balance of the separation of powers (not only between 
branches of government but also between federal and regional levels of government) . 
Although the Constitution is vague regarding who constitutes the 'representatives' that 
compose the upper chamber, many politicians and lawyers protested that such extensive 
reforms required full-blown constitutional amendment, not mere legislation.34 A transfer of 
power from the Federation Council to a proposed 'State Council' under the executive 
branch would almost certainly require such amendment. Nikolai Fedorov, president of the 
republic of Chuvashia and an outspoken critic of the reforms, led other senators to begin an 
appeal to the Constitutional Court, contending that 'all honest lawyers admit that these 
reforms and laws are essentially revising the existing constitutional structure of the Russian 
Federation .. .'.35 
One month after Putin's initial reform package, the federal Constitutional Court issued a 
Determination ( Opredelenie) on the constitutions of Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, 
Komi, N. Ossetia, and Tatarstan.36 This highly critical document rejected the claims to 
sovereignty (several bordering on the doctrine of nullification) made by these republics over 
the past decade. The decision of the Court-a court of discretionary jurisdiction-at such a 
29 See e.g. an uki& at 15 May suspending a resolution levying fines by the head of Smolen.sk oblas t as a violation 
of federal law. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 May 2000, p. 4. Other early decrees tnrgetcd nUcged violations by Aclygeya, 
Ingushetia, Amur, and Tver. 
3o Segodnya, 16 May 200 0 , p. 4. 
31 Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 52'20 (2000) : 2- 4. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 20 May 2000, p. 3. Segodnya, 31 
May 2000, pp. 1-2. 
32 Original proposals published in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 May 2000, pp. 4-5 . 
33 The Fecle.rn tion C',o uncil predictably vetoed its own proposed dissolution and the federal executive power to 
dismiss governo'rs. While in the latter case, the Duma overrode that veto with a 1:3 majority, a special conciliation 
commission was necessary to pass the amended Federation Council reform. Local government reform, Putin's third 
prong, provoked comparatively less controversy. 
34 RF Constitution, Art. 95, ss 2 . 
35 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 4/148 Part 1, 3 Aug. 2000, 36. 
36 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossyskoy Federatsii, 27 June 2000. 
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charged moment in Russian politics was viewed by some a a politic{! [ warning as mu h a a 
lega l rul.ing. 1b olhers the Omt's decision was unimportant. A senior official of the Per-
manent Mission of the Republic of Bashkortostan i.n Mo cow observed (o a condition of 
anonymity): 'In Russia, the polltical process ls more important than the law itself. So the 
agreements of our president with the Russian Federation president are more impo.rtanl than 
the law. The Cons t·itutional Court of Russia is just a body, highly respected, but j11st a body 
of the Russian Federation. It has nothing to do with the Republic ofBashkortostau-we have 
our own Constitutional Court.'37 In Tatarstan, Tat;u· nationalists presented that republic's 
parliament and president with a bill declaring the decision invalid on its territory.38 
Of course, such thinking is not new, but part of the ong ing, sometimes s~hlzor hren.ic, 
conceptual batlie over basic principles of federalism. The latest attempt at reform draws 
from that legacy as rnuch as it continues it. The future of the 'new Russian federalism' 
depends in large part on what balance can be struck between vafol a ·sertious of regional 
autonomy and federa l obligations to promote and protect democratic principles and a 
unified legal space rlrroughout the count1y. As ne respected legal scholar bserved, Putin's 
federal reforms 'unwittingly u11leashed. a war', the re olution of which will not be quick and 
the outcome of which is impossible to predict.39 
37 Author's interview, Moscow, 14 July 2o cio. 
38 Boris Bronshtein, 'Vosstanovit' nezavisimost' ', Izvestiya (online), 9 Aug. 20 0 0 . 
39 William Smirnov, prominent political scientist and lawyer, Institute of Swee and I.aw. Author's interview, 
Moscow, 13 July 2000. 
